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This paper tests to what extent are corporate tax differentials motivating the 
reallocation of reported profits between EU parent multinationals and their European 
based affiliates. Hines and Rice (1994) report that a 1-percentage point reduction in 
corporation tax induces a 3% rise in reported profitability of European based affiliates 
of US parent multinationals. 
 
When aggregated firm-level tax data are used and do not directly control for the 
parent-affiliate pair-wise trading environments, we obtain a semi-elasticity of -2.4 that 
is similar to previous research. But when we apply firm-level information on the total 
bundle of tax liabilities and control for the trading environment of each parent-
affiliate pair we obtain a semi-elasticity of –0.25. This suggests that while corporation 
tax differences do affect reported profitability; the magnitude of this effect is lower 





This paper tests t o what extent are corporate tax differentials motivating the 
reallocation of reported profits between EU parent multinationals and their European 
based affiliates. Hines and Rice (1994) report that a 1-percentage point reduction in 
corporation tax induces a 3% rise in reported profitability of European based affiliates 
of US parent multinationals. 
 
One issue highlighted by previous research is that a single measure of the tax rate 
cannot capture industry and firm specific tax deductions and other features of the tax 
system. In this paper we address this issue by using data containing information on 
the total bundle of corporate tax actually paid by each firm. This is important because 
we shown the actual tax rates paid by affiliates can vary widely across firms even 
within a unified tax regime. The second innovation is that, we use matched parent-
affiliate data to control for the pair-wise trading environment. Allotting each trading 
pair its own pair-wise variable overcomes some information problems, one of which 
is that we do not know which variables are responsible for the heterogeneity bias in 
effective tax rates.  
 
When we do not use the firm-level reported tax liabilities and directly control for the 
parent-affiliate pair-wise trading environments, we obtain a semi-elasticity of -2.4 that 
is similar to previous research. But when we apply the individual tax information and 
match each parent-affiliate pair we obtain a semi-elasticity of –0.25. This suggests 
that while corporation tax differences do affect reported profitability, the magnitude 
of this effect is lower than previously reported in studies using information from U.S. 
owned multinationals operating in Europe. 
 
This finding is somewhat unanticipated, given the use of the actual reported tax 
liability faced by individual firms. One potential explanation is that relative to US 
owned multinationals operating in Europe, there is significantly less transfer pricing 
activity among European parent multinationals and their European based affiliates. 
This may be related to the type of FDI strategies used by European multinationals. On 
the one hand the investment may be horizontal in nature, where the multinational is  
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seeking market access or hoping to gain first mover advantage over its rivals. 
Alternatively, the investment may be of the vertical, whereby the firm seeks cost 
savings up and down the vertical chain of production. Investments between advanced 
economies are generally market seeking (horizontal) in nature and thus cost 
considerations (including taxes) are a lower priority. Evidence shows that 
approximately 75 percent of the FDI activity in Europe is accounted for by 
investments between the advanced European countries, which trade in similar goods.  
 
In addition, European multinationals may have sunk cost issues in existing affiliate 
facilities. This might further diminish their ability to quickly alter the location of 
production in order to justify higher reported profits, especially when they face 
incremental corporation tax changes. Alternatively it might be that Hines and Rice 
(1994) get an aggregate effect, but on the wrong aggregated tax measure. This is 
supported by the fact that by aggregating our tax data we can approximate their 
results. Another potential difficulty with this type of model is that lowering tax rates 
can raise returns to capital in an economy or can be associated with higher 








1.  Introduction 
This paper looks at how differences in corporation t ax rates between European 
countries may influence the reported profitability of multinational firms. In particular 
we test how sensitive the reported profits of multinational affiliates based in Europe 
are to host country corporate tax rates. Figure 1 shows that in most OECD countries 
during the 1990’s headline corporate tax rates declined. While in Europe the 
association agreements of 1993 that led to the entry of 10 new member states in 2004 
did not set off this tax competition, it may have intensified the already existing tax 
competition between EU members. Looking at Figure 1 it appears that after 2003 for 
OECD countries outside the EU, average tax rates have somewhat stabilized. But 
headline tax rates in the EU continued to fall from an average of 35 percent in 2000 to 
31 percent by 2004. The European Commission has noted now that; “…the internal 
markets for goods, labour and capital are more integrated, the allocation of capital 
(economic activity and investments) is becoming more and more sensitive to 
differences in corporate taxation”.
1 
 
The landscape of corporate tax liabilities is further complicated by the idiosyncratic 
and complex characteristics of each country’s corporate tax codes. One consequence 
of these incremental changes in tax rates and codes in Europe is that a firms corporate 
tax liability is imperfectly linked with its profitability and that the corporate tax 
system is not perfectly progressive. All this points to the fact that there is considerable 
heterogeneity both within and between  EU member states in terms of corporate  
taxation rates. 
 
Previous studies on how corporate tax influences pre-tax reported profitability 
generally relate the average profitability of affiliate firms to an average of the 
effective tax rate in a region. These studies have tended to find a very large sensitivity 
of reported profits to corporate tax. For instance, Hines and Rice (1994) estimated a 
semi-elasticity of reported affiliate profits with respect to corporate tax rates of –3.0. 
In such a case, an increase in the headline corporate tax rate from 10% to 11% in a 
                                                 




particular country would result in a 3% fall in reported pre-tax profitability of 
multinational affiliates.  
 
The result obtained by Hines and Rice (1994) is based on aggregate tax data, which 
they acknowledge is a rather crude estimate: 
“Of course, no single measure of the corporate income tax rate can 
accurately capture the precise differences in tax burdens corporations 
face in different countries. For one thing, the complexity of tax codes 
(including different provisions for tax deductions, depreciation rules, 
loss carry-forwards and carry-backs, and non-standard income concepts) 
precludes the possibility of distilling a well-defined tax rate for each 
country. In addition, a single tax rate cannot capture industry and firm 
specific tax holidays and other features”. 
In this paper we are able to advance research on this issue in two related ways.  
Firstly, the paper incorporates more accurate tax rates, using data on the total bundle 
of tax paid by each multinational parent and its individual affiliates. This includes 
corporation, local and employment taxes that can be levied on the firm. Obviously 
using the data on the tax paid by individual firms is more relevant because what firms 
are interested in is the actual tax rate they face in a particular location.  Secondly, we 
use controls for each individual parent-affiliate trading pair. This strategy is employed 
because we do not have perfect information on which variables are responsible for the 
heterogeneity bias in effective tax rates between firms, across sectors or within 
countries, so we simply allow each trading pair to have its own pair-wise variable [see 
Cheng and Wall (2004)].   
 
Performing the analysis using firm-specific information on the complete bundle of 
taxes, and matched parent-affiliate data turns out to have a substantial impact on the 
magnitude of the corporate tax semi-elasticity. When the methodology of Hines and 
Rice is applied to the data, we obtain a semi-elasticity of -2.4 for reported affiliate 
profits with respect to corporate tax rates, which is similar to the -3.0 found by Hines 
and Rice. However, when analysis is done using firm-level tax information and 
controlling for the parent-affiliate relationship we obtain a semi-elasticity of -0.25. 
This would suggest that European multinationals and their affiliates are much less 
sensitive to tax changes in deciding where to report their profits than previously had  
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been thought. Consequently, it could be argued that the concern in some European 
countries about any potential negative effects arising from harmful corporate tax 
competition might be somewhat overstated. 
 
This result is perhaps somewhat surprising, given the use of a more realistic tax 
liability faced by individual firms results in a much lower response to potential 
corporate tax changes. So why do the results obtained in this paper differ from 
previous estimates of the effect of tax on declared profits? One potential explanation 
is that relative to US owned affiliates operating in Europe, there is significantly less 
transfer pricing activity among European parent multinationals and their European 
based affiliates. The result may be linked to the issue of horizontal (market access – 
first mover advantage) versus vertical ( cost considerations) FDI strategies. 
Investments between advanced economies are generally market seeking (horizontal) 
in nature and thus cost considerations (including taxes) are a lower priority. Evidence 
shows that approximately 75 percent of the FDI activity in Europe is accounted for by 
investments between advanced European countries. In addition, European 
multinationals may have sunk cost issues in existing affiliate facilities. This might 
further dampen their ability to quickly alter the location of production to justify higher 
reported profits, especially when they face incremental corporation tax changes. 
 
Alternatively it might be that Hines and Rice (1994) get an aggregate effect, but on 
the wrong tax measure. This is supported by the fact that we can approximate their 
results aggregating our tax data. A potential problem with this type of model is that 
lowering tax rates can raise returns to capital in an economy or can be associated with 
higher profitability of firms for reasons that are unrelated to active profit 
management. One possible explanation for this is that lowering corporation tax may 
be correlated with other general equilibrium effects.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows; Section 2 looks at the data and summary 
statistics. Section 3 defines the effective tax rate measure, while Section 4 develops 




2.  Data and Summary Statistics 
The dataset used for this analysis is “Amadeus” distributed by  Bureau Van Dijk, 
which includes complete information from the Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss 
Statements of medium and large sized companies in Europe. Firms in the data set 
have to satisfy at least one of the following criteria:  
§ Number of employees greater than 100.  
§ Total assets exceeding 16 million US Dollars.  
§ Operating revenue exceeding 8 million US Dollars.  
 
All multinationals from 1993 through 2001 for which unconsolidated accounts that 
were available separately for the parent and its foreign affiliates were retrieved. Only 
those firms for which the parent has a holding of 50 per cent or more were retained, so 
as to ensure that the parent multinational has effective control over the reporting 
actions of the foreign affiliate.  
 
The availability of the data varies across countries, depending on the local accounting 
legislation. Table 1 shows the distribution of European foreign affiliates and EU 
parents in our panel by country.
2 Where available, firms from all sectors are included 
and the primary i ndustry for the individual plant is reported in the NACE 
classification system at the 4 -digit level. We exclude financial firms in NACE 
categories 65 to 67 because the performance of these firms may be influenced by 
financial flows, which are potentially volatile and are not the subject of this analysis. 
A parent firm may have multiple affiliates and in this sample the average number of 
affiliates each parent firm controls is three. We match each affiliate to its parent 
group. For example Volkswagen controls 18 affiliates in our data. There are 1,251 
parent firms, and 4,304 affiliates of which 997 are located in Eastern Europe, which 
gives a total of about 50,000 observations over the 9-year period.  
 
2.1 Sectoral Coverage 
The OECD Measuring Globalisation database contains 9 broad industry categories, 
with information on both the number and employment levels of multinational 
affiliates in Europe. Using the Amadeus data we constructed a matching set for 7 of 
                                                 
2 Irish Foreign Affiliates in the data are termed as true 'manufacturing' companies who face a headline 
corporate tax rate of 10% that will last until 2010.  
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the same broad industry categories for which we had information and conducted a 
correlation test of how representative our selected data is of the OECD measure of 
multinational activity in Europe. Using a rank correlation coefficient we obtained a 
correlation coefficient of 0.68 between our data and the Measuring Globalisation 
database, which suggests that the data in this analysis is reasonably representative of 
multinational activity in Europe.   
 
One caveat concerning the conclusions in this paper is that results are based on the 
total bundle of taxes paid by the firm and not just taxable profits. The data contains a 
relatively fixed element (e.g. local taxes, which are generally related to plant size) and 
a more variable element (e.g. reported profitability). In addition, this dataset contains 
only a limited number of US-owned corporations and it is possible that the profit 
reporting behaviour of US-owned affiliates operating in Europe could be different 
from the patterns reported in this study. 
 
3.  Corporate Tax Data 
Differences in the handling of tax allowances, exemptions, and exclusions mean that 
at company level, even when two affiliates of the same multinational parent are 
operating in the same country their tax liabilities can differ. Owing to the complexity 
of the potential tax obligations confronting the different affiliates, many studies 
examining the impact of corporate tax on profit reporting rely on an average effective 
tax rate measure (ETR) to reflect these differences.  This effective tax rate measure is 
a rough proxy that distills the interaction of various tax rules on firm profitability.  
 
Further evidence of the heterogenous nature of reported profitability and tax payments 
is provided in Figures 2-4, which show, by sector, the total tax payments relative to 
non-financial profits for affiliates. Germany and Ireland are used as examples, 
because Germany operates a relatively high corporate tax rate regime coupled with a 
set of complex tax codes. On the other hand Ireland is often cited as a country that 
operates a relatively low corporate tax regime coupled with a fairly flat tax system. 
While not reported, additional calculations show that on average similar within and 




Figure 2 shows the calculated effective tax rates for the highest and lowest deciles by 
sector in Germany. The large differences across sectors and between deciles are partly 
explained by the complexity of the German tax codes, which at times require up to 
40,000 pages of documentation. One might expect that this was not the case for 
Ireland with a relatively flat tax system. But looking at Figures 3 and 4 we see clear 
differences between the tax liabilities of the highest and lowest deciles, both within 
and across sectors. In general, what this demonstrates is that tax rates vary widely 
across firms both across and even within sectors in the same unified tax regime.  
 
Additional evidence on the importance of differences in effective tax rates within a 
unitary tax regime comes from a Belgium study by Vandenbussche and Tan (2005). 
They show that firms operating in Belgium face different levels of effective tax rates 
depending on either the sector or region in which they operate, or both. In addition, 
they report that while firm size and profitability show a significant statistical 
relationship to effective tax rates, relative to the other explanatory variables their 
magnitudes are small. So firms face a corporate tax system that is not perfectly 
progressive and in practice every firm faces a different corporate tax rate relative to 
their individual characteristics. In other words, there is an information gain in 
estimating the relationship between corporate tax and reported profitability at the 
parent-affiliate level of aggregation.  
 
3.1 Calculating Corporate Taxes  
There are several methods of calculating effective tax rates and the particular method 
selected depends on what relationship one is attempting to examine. Mendoza et al. 
(1994) developed a macro time-series approach for estimating effective capital 
income tax rates, which is the sum of personal capital and corporate income taxes 
divided by the total operating surplus of a country. Gorter et al. (2000) use OECD tax 
revenue and national accounts data to calculate Mendoza effective tax rates for 
several EU countries for the period 1990 to 1997.  They show that France and 
Germany have relatively low effective tax rates, while Britain and Sweden are at the 
high end of their grouping. It appears that across time the rate remains quite stable 
except for the measured declines in Finland and Sweden.  The problem with 
Mendoza’s effective tax rate measure is that the tax- authorities generally only report  
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tax revenue gathered by personal and corporate sources.  Therefore, they do not 
uniquely identify tax revenue coming from capital income.  
 
Micro-level studies aggregate firm-level information, usually they calculate a 
country’s effective tax rate as the corporation tax paid divided by pre tax profit for all 
firms.  To overcome the problem of outliers, the median ratio within a country is used 
to compute the effective corporation tax rate (rather than the mean). There are 
significant differences between the macro approach and this micro approach. For 
example the macro methods refer to the complete capital taxation system not just 
corporation tax, whereas the micro level effective tax rate captures the country 
specific features of the tax base [see MARC, (1999), Gropp and Kostial, (2000)].  In 
Europe the big five (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden) have higher 
effective tax rates relative to smaller countries, however, effective corporation tax 
rates have tended to decline and somewhat converge over time.  
 
The marginal effective tax rate is another method for calculating effective tax rates 
and is based upon c ountry specific tax codes.  Essentially, this measures the 
difference imposed by domestic tax (the percentage wedge) on pre and post tax 
required rates of return on investment projects near the margin [King and Fullerton, 
(1984)].  The King and Fullerton method is based on country level fiscal policy data 
and attempts to utilise this information set to capture the effect of fiscal policy 
changes on investment behaviour.  
 
Unfortunately, the King and Fullerton marginal effective tax rate is very sensitive to 
changes in it’s underlying assumptions. Chennels and Griffith (1997) calculated the 
King and Fullerton marginal effective tax rates based on the return that individual 
shareholders require, which included personal and corporate taxation. France and 
especially Ireland appear to operate a low tax rate system compared to the other 
countries for which data is available. Interestingly, the King and Fullerton marginal 
effective tax rates seem quite low, when compared to either the macro or the micro 
estimates. One note of caution about these effective tax rate measures is that one can 
look at trends over the medium to long run with some confidence, while annual 




3.2 Effective Tax Rates 
The firm level annual average ETR used for this study is derived from annual audited 
company accounts. In the literature [e.g. Vandenbussche and Tan (2005)] a common 
formulation for a firm level annual average effective tax rate is the ratio of Tax Paid 
(Ti) over Profit before tax (Ii): 
 




   
 
In principle, at the end of the tax period a firm calculates its Taxable Income (TI), 
which it then multiplies by the Statutory Tax Rate (t), which gives the firm’s actual 
tax liability for that year. We refer to this as the amount of Tax Payable (T), which the 
firm is required to remit to the tax gathering authority: 
 
(2) TTIt =·    
 
In the firm-level data used in this study, taxable income is not reported. However, our 
company accounts data contains information on the total bundle of Tax Paid and 
Profits Before Tax. One can obtain a measure for Tax Preferences (TPi) by calculating 
the difference between Profit Before Tax (Ii) and Taxable Income (TIi): 
 
(3)  iiiiii TPITIorTIITP =-=-    
 
To obtain a firm level measure of the Effective Tax Rate it is necessary to control for 
the fact that Tax Preferences contain both transitory and permanent differences 
between accounting profit and taxable income. If we substitute Taxable Income (TIi) 












==-·   
  
4.  Empirical Framework  
In estimating the sensitivity of reported profits to changes in corporate tax rates the 
empirical framework adopted is similar to Hines and Rice (1994), where differences  
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in reported profitability are explained by differences in regional effective corporate 
tax rates. One of the control variables is assets, which is a proxy for firm size and a 
second is unit wage costs to control for labour productivity differences. GDP per 
capita is used to control for the country specific trading environment of the affiliate. 
The model is outlined in equation (5): 
 
(5)  it t it it it at InGDP COMP AST EFT e b b b b b p + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln ln  
 
Where the log of the affiliates pre-tax non-financial profits (lnNFPit) is the dependent 
variable. The main explanatory variables are (lnEFTit) which is the annual average 
effective tax rate of the affiliate, (lnASTit) is the log of assets (plant, property and 
equipment), (lnCOMPit) is the log of per unit wage costs and (lnGDPit) is the log of 
per capita GDP (we use a purchasing power of parity adjusted measure of per capita 
GDP).  
 
4.1 Specification Without Fixed Effects 
The first set of results adopts the Hines and Rice (1994) methodology, which 
employed country-level aggregate data on US multinationals and their foreign 
affiliates. The model assumed that a representative US multinational parent firm 
controlled all the foreign affiliates in the data. In the first set of estimates we assume a 
similar setup with a representative EU parent multinational controling all the 
affiliates, with the profit and effective tax measures similarly aggregated.  
 
In this specification ( i p ) is a country’s annual average profitability measure and ( i x ) 
is the country annual average effective tax rate, which is substituted into the (EFTit) 
variable: 
(6)  i i
n
i
i x e b a p + + = ￿
=1
1 0  
 
In the second specification it is again assumed that a representative  EU parent 
multinational controls all the affiliates in one sector, with the profit and effective tax 
measures aggregated to sector level. The results are based on within country sector 
level average reported affiliate profits ( si p ) and within country sector level average  
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affiliate effective tax rates ( si x ), which is again substituted into the (EFTit) variable 





si x e b a p + + = ￿
=1
1 0  
 
The remaining estimates are based on within country firm level reported profits ( asi p ) 
and within country firm level effective tax rates ( asi x ) and are based on individual 
parent and affiliate level annual unconsolidated account data, which is again 
substituted into the (EFTasi) variable for each individual firm: 
 
 (8)  i asi asi x e b a p + + = 1 0  
 
4.2 Pair-wise Fixed Effects   
Many models tend to use the relative corporate tax rate as one of the prime-
determining factors for the reported profitability of a multinational affiliate in a 
particular location. So empirical tests looking at the correlation between corporation 
tax rates and affiliate profits have to control for both the country-specific tax 
environment of the affiliate and the affiliates trading relationship with the 
multinational parent.  
 
The problem is that taxes are one of several correlated factors affecting profitability, 
for example, proximity to large wealthy markets and the relative abundance of 
physical infrastructure are two of these. This is one reason why some studies, in other 
contexts, have used pair-wise fixed effects techniques to estimate a range of trading 
relationships and how borders can affect trade. More generally, pair-wise fixed effects 
models can control for unobserved or mis-specified factors that may concurrently 
explain, for example, the flows or interactions between trading partners.  
 
Wall (2001) used fixed effects models to estimate the effects of borders on trade. 
Glick and Rose (2001) applied a fixed effects model to estimate the trade effects of 
currency unions. This paper follows Glick and Rose (2001), using only one fixed 
effect for each parent and affiliate pair. The pair-wise fixed effects model is shown in 




(9)  apt it at at at t ap at InGDP COMP AST EFT NFP e b b b b b b + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln  
 
It employs ( ap b ) and ( t b ) to control for the unobservable elements in the affiliate and 
parent environment, to control for time-constant determinants of total assets, time 
effects, quality of local management and general unobservable firm level 
heterogeneity.  We also include time (t), sector (s) and unemployment (u) controls and 
report robust standard errors. Robust standard errors are used to control for the 




5. Main Results 
In Table 2, columns 1 and 2 report results based on affiliate profitability and country 
average effective tax rates. The results in columns 3 and 4 are based on averages of 
sector level reported profits and sector average effective tax rates. While the results in 
columns 5 and 6 are based on the matched individual parent and affiliate level annual 
unconsolidated account data. 
 
Applying the Hines and Rice method to our data at the country level we obtain a 
semi-elasticity of –2.41 for the tax variable. The magnitude of this corporate tax co-
efficient is broadly similar to the results in the previous literature. Grubert and Mutti 
(2000) use tax return data for 500 U.S. multinationals and show that a lower tax rate 
that increases after-tax return by 1 per cent is associated with additional (real) capital 
investment of 3 per cent. 
 
In columns 3 and 4 the same regression is run replacing average profits with firm 
level profit and replacing the average effective tax rate with an average sector 
effective tax rate. Using these sector measures the magnitude of the tax co-efficient 
declines to  –1.46. This is similar to Altshuler et al (2001) who looked at US 
manufacturing firms in 58 countries and found the elasticity of (real) capital 
                                                 
3 The subscripts (a) represents the affiliate and (p) the parent company; (i) identifies the country; (t) is 
the time operator and (s) is the NACE Clio sector, while  4 , 3 , 2 , 1 b  are the parameters to be estimated 
and  apt e  is a white noise error term.  
 
14
investment to after tax rates of return to be approximately -1.5 for 1984 and close to -
3.0 for 1992. A further study by Desai et al (2002) looked at the sensitivity of foreign 
direct investment undertaken by US multinationals to the host country tax in Asia, 
Europe and Latin America.  They report particularly strong effects within Europe 
where a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rate is associated with a 7.7 per 
cent reduction in FDI and 1.7 per cent lower returns on assets.   
 
Looking at the firm level regression results in the final two columns we obtain a tax 
co-efficient of –0.25 and –0.24 respectively. Our initial set of results suggests that for 
the firm, the relevant tax rate is the actual rate paid and not the average tax rate for 
that sector or country. It also shows that what is important to multinationals is the 
actual tax rates paid by affiliates, which can vary across firms within the same sector, 
even in a unified tax regime of a country. These results using data based on the tax 
rate actually paid by affiliates suggest that the estimates based on aggregated data 
could potentially be out by as much as a factor of 10.  
 
The log of plant, property and equipment (which is a proxy for firm size) and the log 
of compensation, are, as predicted, positively related to the dependent variable. Log of 
GDP per capita is positively related to firm profits, indicating that it captures elements 
of market size and wealth that concurrently influence profit. 
 
Looking at Table 3, columns 1 and 2 give the fixed effects results, while columns 3 
and 4 show the pair-wise fixed effects results. As previously discussed, the estimates 
also contain country and sector identifiers as additional control variables. Once more 
we report a negative co-efficient for the effective tax rates for the entire sample. The 
other explanatory variables are again all positively related to the dependent variable. 
The main point worth noting is that employing pair-wise fixed effects along with the 
additional control variables, have reduced the magnitude of the tax co-efficient to 
circa –0.10. Interestingly, the co-efficient for plant, property and equipment (or firm 
size) is similar to our earlier results.  
 
5.1 Sector and Regional Results  
Turning to the results contained in Table 4, which splits the  sample into 
manufacturing and services using matched parent and affiliate information. Columns  
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(1) and (2) give the results for affiliates located in the EU-15, while columns (3) and 
(4) give results for Eastern European affiliate firms, both for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing respectively. When the sample is split, we see that for the EU the 
results remain approximately unchanged, but for the Eastern European affiliates the 
magnitude of the tax co-efficient is smaller.  Overall, the results in column (1) at -0.28 
and column (3) at -0.07 suggest that some active profit management is taking place. 
The other possibility is that taxes have a much smaller effect than previously 
estimated for the manufacturing sector in both the EU 15 and especially Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Interestingly, the results for Eastern European affiliates are well below what Gorter 
and Parikh (2000) report for Portugal just prior to entry into the EU. The tax co-
efficient for affiliate firms operating in non-manufacturing sectors is not significant 
and therefore not different from zero.  Our results indicate that, during the period of 
this study, corporation tax did affect individual affiliate profit, but the magnitude of 
this effect is considerably below that previously reported. Gorter and Parikh (2000) 
for example give co-efficients of -4.6 and -2.3 for France and Germany respectively  
 
Affiliate assets are positive for each sector in both regions. However, the co-efficients 
are only statistically significant for affiliate manufacturing. One possible explanation 
for this is that physical assets are more important for manufacturing. If one takes 
affiliate assets as a proxy for firm size we can see that, on average, EU affiliates are 
larger (in terms of capital investment) than their Eastern European counterparts.  
 
An alternative explanation for these differing results for the Eastern European region 
and the EU-15 is that production techniques are not the same. This could be a result of 
the central planning system formerly operating in the E astern European region. 
Central planners focused on economies of scale and therefore the average size of a 
manufacturing facility tended to be large (especially in terms of numbers employed) 
by Western European standards. Product development, R&D and innovation lagged 
behind Western Europe across a broad range of goods and services As part of 
industrial and general development strategy these large firms were often placed in less 




Much of the FDI activity into the Eastern Europe during the period of this study was 
of the merger and acquisition variety (see Roland, 2000). Therefore, it is likely in the 
early years of this study that production techniques lagged those in EU affiliates. This 
is reflected in the low skill activities that Eastern European CEE affiliates are often 
engaged in, such as assembly operations in the car, white good and latterly computer 
industries.  
 
Aggregate data shows that a large proportion of the economy in the EU-15 is in the 
service sector, whereas in the CEE the service sector, while expanding rapidly during 
the 1990s, was much smaller. This result tends to confirm the hypothesis that, where a 
European multinational is already operating in manufacturing, they appear to employ 
active profit management techniques to minimise their exposure to group wide 
corporate tax liabilities. 
 
5.2 Robustness Tests 
As estimated, the profit model ignores the fact that some EU countries operate a tax 
credit system (for example the UK and Italy), while others use the tax exemption 
system.  A tax credit system is used by tax authorities in conjunction with bi-lateral 
tax agreements to top-up the domestic tax liabilities of firms repatriating profits 
earned abroad. A firm whose foreign affiliate pays their tax liabilities in the affiliate 
country faces a top-up tax at home if these net profits (after tax) are repatriated. To 
control for these differences we estimate the elasticity for tax-exempt countries, 
conditional on a zero-elasticity for affiliate tax credit countries [see: Slemrod (1990) 
and Hines (1996)].  
 
Table 5 gives manufacturing sector results for the effect of corporate tax on reported 
net (pre-tax) profit. We look at three regions in Europe: (1) EU low tax region; (2) EU 
high tax region and (3) the Eastern European regions.
4 Looking at the size effect (log 
of affiliate assets) we see that on average EU low tax region affiliates are smaller than 
those in EU high tax or Eastern European regions respectively. The interaction effect 
is negative and statistically significant for the EU estimations. In column (1) we see 
results for the EU low tax region with a co-efficient of -0.37, while the estimated 
                                                 
4 The high corporate tax countries in this section are Belgium, France and Germany, and the low 
corporate tax countries are Ireland, Portugal and Spain.   
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semi-elasticity for the EU high tax region in column (2) is -0.29, Gorter and Parikh 
(2000) report -1.00 and -1.50 for Austria and Denmark respectively. Hines (1996), 
reports an elasticity of -10.00 for European tax-exempt countries. In column (3) gives 
the results for Eastern Europe showing the interaction effect, which is not statistically 
significant at -0.07. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tested whether corporate tax differentials are driving the reallocation of 
reported profits between EU parent multinationals and their European based affiliates. 
Studies looking at the profitability of multinational affiliates in Europe have tended to 
find a large sensitivity of reported profits to differences in regional corporate tax rates. 
For instance Hines and Rice (1994) using US parent multinational data report that a 1-
percentage point reduction in corporation tax induces a 3% rise in reported 
profitability of a European based affiliate. 
 
Previous research has also highlighted a set of problems associated with estimates 
based on country average effective corporate tax rates. One concern is that a single 
measure of the tax rate cannot capture industry and firm specific tax holidays and 
other features of the tax system. Another issue that arises when estimating the effect 
of corporate tax on reported profits is that a low tax environment may be associated 
with other general equilibrium effects, which may simultaneously influence firm-level 
profitability. 
 
This paper addresses these issues; firstly, by using data containing information on the 
total bundle of tax actually paid by each firm. This is important because as we have 
shown the actual tax rates paid by affiliates can vary widely across firms even within 
a unified tax regime. Secondly, we use matched parent and affiliate unconsolidated 
account data to control for the trading environment of each parent-affiliate pair. Using 
matched parent and affiliate data and allotting each trading pair its own pair-wise 
variable overcomes an information problem, in that we do not know which variables 
are responsible for the heterogeneity bias in effective tax rates, both across and within 




When we do not directly control for the parent-affiliate specific tax and trading 
environments, we obtain a semi-elasticity of -2.4 that is similar to previous research. 
But when we apply the individual tax information and match each parent-affiliate pair 
we obtain a semi-elasticity of  –0.25. This suggests that in Europe some profit 
reallocation effects are taking place in all affiliates regardless of location and sector of 
activity. Looking more closely at the estimates in this paper they appear to show that 
profit reallocation occurs mainly between parent firms and their affiliates that are 
operating in the manufacturing sector. On average, these estimates suggest that while 
corporation tax differences do affect reported profitability; the magnitude of this 
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Table 1: Distribution of Multinational Firms by Country and Activity, 1993-2001  
Number  (per cent) 
  Frequency of affiliate firms  Frequency of parent firms 
Austria  131 (3.01)  49 (3.92) 
Belgium  304 (7.01)  81 (6.47) 
Denmark  98 (2.27)  45 (3.60) 
Finland  39 (0.09)  21 (1.67) 
France  451 (10.48)  187 (14.95) 
Germany  485 (11.27)  232 (18.54) 
Greece  -  - 
Ireland  103 (2.39)  27 (2.16) 
Italy  276 (6.41)  78 (6.25) 
Luxemburg  -  - 
Netherlands  324 (7.52)  161 (12.87) 
Portugal  93 (2.16)  - 
Spain  282 (6.55)  18 (1.44) 
Sweden  153 (3.55)  134 (10.71) 
United Kingdom  568 (13.20)  182 (14.55) 
Central & Eastern 
Europe 
997 (23.16)  - 
  4,304  1,251 
Sector Distribution of parent and affiliate firms 
  Affiliate firm 
Parent firm  Manufacturing  Non-manufacturing  Both 
Manufacturing  51.27  30.43  18.30 
Non-manufacturing  23.11  56.93  19.96 
Note: The foreign affiliate column lists the number of foreign controlled affiliate firms operating in that 
country. The European parent column lists the number of parent multinationals in the dataset by their 
home country.  


















































Figure 2: German Effective Tax Rates - 2001 
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Figure 3: Irish Effective Tax Rates (Manufacturing) - 1993 – 2003
5 













                                                 
5 The Irish data has been extended to include 2002 and 2003 for Figures 2 and 3. It shows data for true 
'manufacturing' companies who face a headline corporate tax rate of 10% which will last until 2010; for 
other companies it lasted only until the end of 2000. A company which did not qualify as a true 
'manufacturing' company paid the declining rate of mainstream corporation tax from 2001 until the 
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Figure 4: Irish Effective Tax Rates (Manufacturing) - 2003 
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Table 2: the effect of corporate tax rates on the location of non-financial profit 
Dependent variable: log pre-tax non-financial profits 
Hines & Rice 
Method 
Sector Average  
Tax & Profit 
Firm Level  
Tax & Profit 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 






































Log GDP per 
capita 
-  0.18* 
(0.10) 
-  0.17** 
(0.049) 
-  0.15** 
(0.053) 












R-Squared  0.51  0.50  0.45  0.46  0.35  0.34 
Number of firms  3804  3804  3804  3804  3801  3801 





Table 3: the effect of corporate tax rates on the location of non-financial profit 
Dependent variable: log pre-tax non-financial profits 
Firm Level  
Fixed Effects 
Parent & Affiliate 
Pair-wise Fixed Effects 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


























Log GDP per 
capita 
-  0.18* 
(0.07) 
-  0.26* 
(0.053) 
Location Controls  Y  Y  N  N 
Sector Controls  Y  Y  N  N 








R-Squared  0.35  0.34  0.34  0.33 
Number of Firms  3801  3801  3791  3791 

















Table 4:  Fixed Effects Estimates 
Tax Effects on European Sector Level Results for Profit Shifting 
Dependent variable: log pre-tax non-financial profits 








  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































Sector Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
R-Squared  0.28  0.23  0.26  0.19 
Number of Firms  2241  1563  419  78 


















Table 5: the effect of corporate tax rates on the location of non-financial profit 
Dependent variable: log pre-tax non-financial profits 
Conditional on a zero-elasticity for tax credit countries   
(1) 
EU Low Tax 
(2) 
EU: High Tax 
(3) 
Eastern Europe 




























Location Controls  Y  Y  Y 
Sector Controls  Y  Y  Y 






R-Squared  0.31  0.30  0.28 
Number of Firms  425  1051  603 
Notes: (i) *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels. (ii) Robust standard errors in brackets. 
(iii) The corporate low tax counties are Ireland, Portugal and Spain. (iv) High corporate tax countries are 




It is possible that a MNE earning pre-tax profits  i p in country (i) may adjust those 
reported profits. Consider a parent MNE that has the ability to allocate an additional 
i y  in profits to the affiliate in location (i). To facilitate these actions the parent firm 
may have to: 
§ Undertake inefficient intra-firm trade.   
§ Establish additional facilities at the affiliate location. 
§ Employ additional staff at the affiliate location.  
§ Incur additional accounting, insurance and legal costs.   
This process is likely to be costly, Hines and Rice (1994) theorise that the marginal 






 ratio.  If we permit a  to denote this factor of proportionality, then the total 





. Therefore, the 
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y p - + =  
If a foreign affiliate under reports profit and transfers it to another location it must be 
the case that  0 p i y .  The assumption here is that transferring profits in any direction 
incurs costs within the multinational group, because doing so requires costly actions.  
In addition, the MNE is constrained to have the sum of  i y  non-positive, as by 
definition undertaking intra-firm transfers cannot create extra pre-tax profits for the 
group. 
Consider, for example, the actions of a MNE firm that selects its profit transfers to 
maximise foreign affiliate after-tax returns (R), assuming as fixed profits generated by 









































0 y . 
The first order condition of the maximisation problem with l being the Lagrange 
multiplier corresponding to the constraint in (3a) is: 


































































This equation indicates that reported profitability  ) ( i p  is a function of pre-tax profits 
) ( i p  and the domestic tax rate. Transforming the term on the right hand side of 
equation (6a) into a linear function of the tax rates considerably eases the estimation 
problem.  Therefore take a first-order Taylor expansion of (6a) in  i t , around the 











) 1 ( i
i i i p p .   
Consequentially, it must be the case that; reported profitability given by the MNE, 
exceeds earned profits in low tax locations, and is lower than actual earned profits in 
high tax locations.   
The Lagrange multiplier l  captures the marginal cost of transferring profits between 
locations.  Alternatively, one may view the Lagrange multiplier  l  as the marginal 
country tax rate at which firms have no incentive to either transfer in (or out) locally 
generated profits. One may evaluate the value of earning an additional Euro of pre-
tax profits (pi) in location (i) by reference to the envelope theorem and assuming that 
( i w ) is not very responsive to changes in profit.  
Therefore, equation (2a) indicates the value of additional profitability and assuming 
that the MNE has easy access to capital on world markets and it allocates any given  
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stock of capital optimally, such that (
_
K ) is allocated to maximize (2a). The.  Subject 



































In which (m ) for every location is a constant. It reflects the value of relaxing the 
resource constraint in (8a) by one unit. Employing (5a) gives us: 
(10a)  .
) 1 ( 2
) 1 (


























Equation (10a) captures the MNEs ability to transfer profits between locations when 
doing so facilitates profitable reporting of taxable income.  Thus (10a) captures the 
additional value of earning profits in low-tax countries.  Taking a first-order Taylor 
expansion of (10a) in  i t , around the point at which  ) 1 ( l t - = i gives: 






Consider the following production function to evaluate the investment behaviour that 
is implied by (11a): 
(12a)  .
g q i i i K p =  
Where; i q is the country-specific vector of observable attributes including for example 
GDP  or GNP, unemployment rates and openness to trade, and the parameter  g  
reflects the curvature of the production function.  By differentiating both sides with 
respect to  i K , subject to (11a), and rearranging our terms, we obtain: 
(13a) 
m
g q p g i i
i K
) 1 ( 1 -
=
- . 






i - » - ) 1 ln( .  
This implies the following Investment Allocation Equation: 
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